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The Maoist Movement and the Threat to Democracy in Nepal 
Stephen L. Mikesell 
I sat here in this same forum nine years ago with Com-
rade Baburam Bhattarai, spokesman of the United People's 
Front, the political wing of Nepal's Maoist party. Nepal 
had just emerged six months before from a mass Democ-
racy Movement which had succeeded in ending a three-
decade old system of absolute monarchal rule and official, 
corporate and agency despotism. Through a one-party form 
of government called Panchayat Democracy, the monar-
chy provided the trappings of legitimacy for the country's 
foreign donors to underwrite the state and engage in their 
project of introducing western forms of property, society, 
institutions, interests, commodity forms, aesthetics, 
lifestyles, and values. Overall capitalist control was intro-
duced, backed by local educational institutions and police 
power. 
On the day that we left, we heard that the long awaited 
new constitution had just been implemented, giving Nepal 
a Westminster-type parliament under a constitutional mon-
arch . In that talk, I said that the settlement that had con-
cluded the Democracy Movement and the drafting of the 
new constitution in Nepal represented not the "advent of 
democracy," but the concerted demobilization of the popu-
lation from the political process by an alliance of new 
forces. These new forces, to put it bluntly, had been al-
lowed up to the trough of state power by the "victory" of 
that movement-"victory" in quotes .' 
I'd observed how the settlement was negotiated by a 
small group of political leaders who'd had a marginal role 
in the movement and who abandoned all the demands of 
the movement except one. In the following weeks, I 
watched how the previously underground leaders were 
given ministries and feted by embassies and the represen-
tatives of international donors and corporations, providing 
them a sense of importance that they, rather than the pe.ople 
in the streets, had been the movement. I watched them gro-
1 
"The Interim Constitution and Transition to Democracy in 
Nepal ," in Class, State and Stmggle in . Nepal: Writings 1989-
1995, Manohar, New Delhi, 1999. 
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tesquely put on weight in the intervening months . I remem-
bered how the bodies of demonstrators gunned down by 
the military in the final days were left buried and forgotten 
under lime and earth in the Royal forest. I heard how the 
demands for a constituent assembly, promised three de-
cades ago, were again sidestepped. I also heard how the 
writing of the constitution was taken over by a select group 
of lawyers guided by conservative legal organizations from 
Europe and the United States, which were spending large 
amounts of money to ensure that the new democratic con-
stitutions would fit the needs of the New World Order. And 
I watched the parties, which claimed themselves to be revo-
lutionary, give over the initiative to these individuals and 
interests so their leaders could use their constituencies to 
gain seats in parliament. 
Baburam Bhattarai agreed with my assessment, though 
his party also initially attempted to undertake the struggle 
by entering the new parliament in order to disrupt the sys-
tem from within . But according to Prachandra, the party's 
general secretary, this path threatened to conupt the elected 
members of their party just as it did everyone else, and it 
failed to further the party's revolutionary goals .2 The par-
liamentary system was opening up the country to interna-
tional forces of commercialization and further rural im-
poverishment, not the empowering democracy that had been 
promised . For the people in the countryside, the situation 
was desperate, and the Maoists saw no other possibility 
than revolutionary armed struggle. 
So on February 13, 1996, the Maoists launched what 
they called a People's War, aimed, in their words, at smash-
ing the capitalist state and establishing a Peoples Demo-
cratic Republic. Their aim was to carve out bases in certain 
parts of the country from which they could build their or-
ganization, create an army of cadres through the practice 
2 Li Onesto, "Inside the Revolution in Nepal : Interview with Com-
rade Prachanda," Revolutionwy Worker, no. 1043, 20 February 
2000 (Online: http://www.mcs.netl-rwor). 
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of war, and strengthen and centralize their military to the 
point that it could defeat the military capacity of the en-
emy. That enemy is the government of Nepal and its inter-
national supporters. 
Their means of building these base areas has been to 
attack local representatives of state and class power. These 
include police, banks, government offices, foreign aid sup-
ported projects, and local representatives of what they see 
as the primary exploitative parties, the ruling Congress Party 
and the National Democratic Party (RPP). In many parts 
of their base districts, the Maoists now claim to have largely 
driven out the government officials from the villages and 
they are said to be setting up their own parallel govern-
ment with its own elections and courts.3 They have dis-
mantled much of the government's machinery in 14 dis-
tricts, threaten 17 more, and are actively operating in 31 
other districts- meaning they have taken the war to 62 of 
75 districts of the country with major actions even in the 
other districts. Recently they have also started hitting na-
tional and international targets. In order to undermine the 
confidence of the large multinational corporations that are 
helping to underwrite the state, they recently began destroy-
ing facilities of multinational corporations such as Unilever 
Nepal, Surya Tobacco Company, an Indian Milk company, 
liquor factories, Indian school facilities, and Coca Cola. 
Recently, for the first time, they also targeted a tourist ho-
tel (although the publicity sensitive tourism industry op-
erators say that it wasn't Maoists). 4 
The governments of the RPP and the Nepali Congress 
have reacted by calling the Maoists "terrorists", particu-
larly because it is the members of their parties who are 
being systematically threatened, attacked and killed around 
the country. Several prime ministers have risen and fallen 
on the promise of suppressing the Maoists, while the Maoist 
movement has all the time expanded and recruited increas-
ing numbers of mostly pliable young people. A power 
struggle within the ruling party between KP Bhattarai, the 
previous prime minister, and Girija Koirala, the current one, 
has kept the ruling party from providing any kind of uni-
tary stance versus the Maoist movement and provided the 
Maoists with the room to develop their activities. 
3 
"Maoists conduct more elections," The Kathmandu Post (8 Au-
gust 2000); "Maoists' alternate govt, laughable," Awake (11 Au-
gust 2000) http://www.nepalnews .com.np/contents/ 
englishweekly/awake/1-94/f-pagers. htm. 
4 
"Maoists to now attack industrialists" The Independent (9 Feb-
ruary 2000); "Attack on Tiger Mountain resort sends alarm bell 
ringing," The Independent (19 April 2000); "Maoist Set Fire on 
Tobacco Warehouses," The Kathmandu Post ( 16 June 2000); 
Neeraj Vajracharya, Maoists rattle industrialists, investors," The 
Independent (21 Jun 2000); Maoists strike the Capital: School 
buses burnt, Police Club bombed (24 August 2000) 
18 
There is no love lost for the police, which ,' trained and 
organized on a colonial model, has, for half a century, been 
feared and hated by the general populace and regarded as a 
tool of the oppressors. The police for their part have be-
come extremely corrupt, particularly as they have been 
politicized by subsequent elected governments handing out 
their posts as sinecures.5 The ruling parties and the police 
have a vested interest in the continuance and even expan-
sion of the Maoist war, as it provides the rational for ex-
panded budgets, departments, and importance in national 
life. They receive unquestioned extravagance and privi-
leges.6 The war also justifies the use of extraordinarily re-
pressive means for parties or individuals to keep themselves 
in power. 
The police on the ground are poorly trained and 
equipped for war against an increasingly well-armed and 
growing guerrilla army. There is strong resistance among 
their members against posting in "Maoist Affected Areas". 
Policemen are being sent to these areas as punishment or 
because they lack connections, and even now with finan-
cial and other incentives, postings in these areas are lead-
ing to high rates of resignation.7 Once posted in these ar-
eas, police men and women find themselves confronted by 
a village population that often sympathizes with the Maoist 
cause, as the Maoists are bringing positive changes while 
the police come just to repress, and see the villagers as 
their enemy. And even if the villagers don't have sympa-
thy for or are hostile to the Maoists, the fear of retribution 
from the Maoists keeps them from taking any action that 
appears to help the police. The police in their turn see the 
lack of active support for themselves as tacit support for 
the Maoists, putting the villagers between a stone and a 
hard place. Consequently police action has led to wide-
spread human rights abuses toward the civilian population, 
to say nothing of captured Maoists who are often summarily 
executed or otherwise "disappeared".8 In February the po-
lice went so far as to burn hundreds of houses in several 
5 
"Complex, chronic problems ails Nepal police," The Indepen-
dent (21 January 2000) 
6 
"PAC seeks helicopter use details from Home Ministry," The 
Kathmandu Post ( 16 February 2000). 
7 Kedar Ojha & Shanker Kharel, "In Nepal Police, high connec-
tions matter," Kathmandu Post (14 June 2000); 
"Police posts sitting ducks for Maoists," The Independent (23-29 
February 2000); Akhilesh Upadhyay, "Police morale low, mu-
tiny feared," The Kathmandu Post (2000 February 25) 
8 
"AI report nails police, Maoists" The Kathmandu Post ( 14 June 
2000); "AI warns Nepal on rights," The Kathmandu Post (14 
February 2000); "UN official accuses police of extrajudicial 
deaths," The Kathmandu Post (15 February 2000) 
9 
"Six villages set afire in Rukum," The Kathmandu Post (2000 
Feb 24); "Maoists kill 2 more even as parties react on Rukum 
incident," The Kathmandu Post (24 February 2000) 
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areas thought to have housed insurgents after a large num-
ber of police were killed .9 
Such rights abuses have opened the government to criti-
cism from the opposition, the press, and national and inter-
national human rights organizations. The Parliament, early 
in 1996, passed an Act for the Establishment of a National 
Human Rights Commission to deal with human rights vio-
lations by police, but subsequent governments resisted the 
establishment of such a commission. I assume this is be-
cause it would limit the impunity with which the govern-
ment could ac:t and perhaps because too much of the liabil-
ity for human rights abuses would extend to them. Under 
great pressure, such a commission was only recently es-
tablished.10 But housed within the secretariat and depen-
dent upon it for its perks, and with political appointees 
among its members, editorialists say the commission is a 
"toothless tiger"'' -a mere formality to ward off criticism 
against the government. The chairman, who is the former 
chief justice of the Panchayat regime, created further con-
troversy by saying "that he liked the Panchayat system 
better than the present multiparty set-up." 
The failure and political liability of using force increases 
calls of negotiations .12 Both the Maoists and the various 
governments have said that they will negotiate and negoti-
ating teams were created by both sides, but have never come 
together.13 The Maoists set minimal conditions for nego-
tiations: disclosure and whereabouts of people arrested by 
the police, release of all those atTested on charges of being 
Maoists, and treatment of prisoners according to the Geneva 
Convention. 14 However, they will not lay down arms or 
give up their long-tetm goal of establishing a proletariat 
system of government. 15 The government, on the other 
hand, won't talk except within the constitutional frame-
10 
"HRC could now be a reality," The Independent (16 February 
2000); "Attention to human rights," The Independent (16 Febru-
ary 2000). 
11 Dhana Thapa, "HRC should be independent, impartial," Nepali 
Times (16 Aug 2000) . 
12 
"Create environment for talks," The Independent (2000 Jun 
21); "Govt should create environment for talks," The Indepen-
dent (5 July 2000) . 
13 
"Ball in govt's court after Maoist declaration," The Indepen-
dent (16 February 2000); "Talks with Maoists will be held in 
Nepal: Deuba," The Kathmandu Post (14 June 2000); "CWC 
directs govt to formulate policy before talks with Maoists." The 
Kathmandu Post (25 June 2000); 
14 
"Never Ending Battle", Kathmandu Post (16 Jun 2000) http:// 
www. nepal news.com.np/contents/engl ishdai ly /ktmpost/1999/ J ul/ 
Jul30/index.htm#2 
' s "Maoists rule out immediate dialogue with government," The 
Kathmandu Post (7 August 2000); "Maoists decision, jolt for 
govt.," The Independent (9 August 2000) . 
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work, with no compromise of its basic two principles of 
multi-party democracy and constitutional monarchy. Prime 
Minister Koirala fears that successful negotiations would 
undercut his position in his party by bringing other people 
to the fore .16 When Bhattarai worked to open negotiations 
while he was prime minister, Girija engaged in a tour of 
anti-Maoist rallies in which he turned the party against 
negotiations and replaced Bhattarai as Prime Minister. As 
Prime Minister, he undercut the negotiating team in order 
to keep the chairman from gaining acclaim at the expense 
of the Koirala family. 
Perhaps exposing the real intentions of this series of 
governments, the Rastriya Prajatantra Party's Chand in 
1996, Surya BahadurThapa in 1998, and Congress's Girija 
Koirala in 1999 all introduced strict anti-ten·orist legisla-
tion which would suspend the constitutional protections of 
the citizens from the police.17 This legislation includes ar-
16 
"Govt must have clear stance on 'talks"' The Independent (21 
June 2000); "Ball in Deuba's court," The Independent (25 Jul 
2000); "Serious 'crisis of confidence' foiling Deuba's peace ef-
forts," The Kathmandu Post (24Aug 2000); "Editorial: Let Deuba 
talk," The Nepali Times (13 September 2000). 
17 
"Khadka hints at tougher law," Kathmandu Post (30 July 1999) 
http://www.nepalnews.com.np/contents/englishdaily/ktmpost/ 
1999/Jul/Jul30/index.htm#2 
"Activists against draconian law," Kathmandu Post (2 August 
1999) 
http://www. nepal news . com. n p/ contents/eng I i shdai I y I 
ktmpost/1999/ Aug/ Aug02/index.htm 
"Thwart draconian law," Kathmandu Post (3 August 1999) 
http://www.nepalnews.com.np/contents/englishdaily/ktmpost/ 
1999/Aug/ Aug03/editorial.htm 
"Terrorists Control Bill ruled out now," Kathmandu Post (6 
August 1999) 
http: I /ww w. nepal news . com. n p/ contents/ englishd ai I y I 
ktmpost/1999/Aug/Aug07/index l.htm 
"Congress's decision to make police all powerful," Awake 
( 19 August 1999) 
http://www. nepal news. com . np/con tents/englishweekl y I 
awake/ 1-95/f-pagers.htm 
"Govt put law to curb insurgency," Kathmandu Post (22 Sep-
tember 1999) http://www.nepalnews .com.np/contents/ 
englishdaily/ktmpost/1999/Sep/Sep22/index l.htm 
"Serial blasts reported," Kathmandu Post (24 September 
1999) 
http : I lw ww. nepal news. com. n p/ contents/eng I i shdai I y I 
ktmpost/1999/Sep/Sep24/index.htm 
"Too draconian," The Kathmandu Post ( 1999 September 24) 
http://www.nepalnews.com.np/contents/englishdaily/ktmpost/ 
1999/Sep/Sep24/editoriall.htm 
"Speaker Rananabhat rules out need of new terrorist control 
Act," Nepal News (2000August 1) http://www.nepalnews.com.np/ 
contents/archive/mainnews/arc56.htm 
"Nine leftist parties protest terrorist control bill," Nepal News 
(2000 September 27) 
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rest without warrant and custody for 3 months without ju-
dicial sanction, empowerment of the army, and suspension 
of press freedoms. These acts were strongly contested by a 
wide range of elements in the society, who warned of an 
escalation of arbitrary detention, torture and even extraju-
dicial killings. It was said that such an act "won't salvage 
people from terror but terrorize them ." Amnesty Interna-
tional strongly criticized these efforts, saying that Nepal 
should learn a lesson from Sri Lanka, India, Pakistan, and 
Bangladesh, countries in which such acts led to widespread 
human rights abuses and wars without end, both of which 
have brought immense suffering to their population. 18 
For a long time, the government, particularly of Girija 
Koirala, has wanted to mobilize the army. The army has 
resisted entry into the war or even providing the police with 
automatic weapons, for reasons that I cannot quite com-
prehend. Although the Maoists anticipate that the ruling 
classes will throw the army at them as the war develops, 
they have fastidiously avoided confronting the army while 
building their base areas. I sense that the army feels that 
this is an inter-party and not a national war, and it does not 
want to become a tool of one party's suppression of an-
other or of the populace. It has even resisted supplying the 
police with more up-to-date weapons. Non-Maoist oppo-
sition Communist parties are also strongly opposed to the 
use of the army for this reason, and their leaders say that it 
would lead the country on the road to a bloody civil war. 
Unable to mobilize the army, the Girija government 
thus created two divisions within the police under two dif-
ferent Inspector Generals: an armed paramilitary section 
to combat the Maoists in the affected areas, and the regular 
police in other areas. 19 Recruitment to the paramilitary has 
been a problem, since the police see it as a punishment, 
regardless of the higher pay and promised promotions. 
Policemen say they don't want to go to these regions and 
die. 
18 
"AI warns Nepal on rights," The Independent (2000 February 
14); "Nepal told to learn from S Asian mistakes" The Kathmandu 
Post (24 February 2000). 
19 
"Government may appoint two IGPs," The Independent (26 
January 2000); "Govt confirms concept of two IGPs, The Inde-
pendent (2 February 2000); "IGP stresses need for armed police 
force," The Kathmandu Post (3 March 2000); "Govt mulling to 
restructure Police organization: Minister Khadka," Rising Nepal 
(6 March 2000); "Koirala to use strong arm tactics against 
Maoists," The Independent (12 April 2000); "Comment: Don ' t 
mobilise army only," The Independent (12April2QOO); "PM seeks 
to mobilise army to end insurgency," The Kathmandu Post (15 
April 2000) 
20 
"Fiddling While Dolpo Burns (Editorial), The Nepal Times (27 
September 2000) http://www,nepalnews.com.np/ntimes/sep27-
2000/editorial.htm#FIDDLING; 
"After Dolpa incident, Maoists in favor of an 'extensive united 
20 
A recent massive attack by 300 Maoist ·guen·illas on 
the district headquarters and prison in Dolpa killed and 
wounded unprecedented numbers of police and led to the 
takeover of the headquarters for a while until the Maoists 
withdrew.20 The army had a large base immediately on the 
other side of the river but stood by during the five-hour 
long pitched battle. This led the government to critic ize 
the army for failing to help and provide guns to the police, 
which would help to force a consensus among all the par-
liamentary parties to finally mobilize the army over the 
protests of its commanding officersY Given our knowl-
edge of other guerrilla wars, it is likely to be the general 
populace which will suffer the wrath of army, with increas-
ing human rights violations and greater polarization of the 
country. 
Girija also called up the National Security Council 
(NCD) allowed by the constitution only in a National Emer-
gency, which would allow him to mobilize the army. There 
is also a rumor that he plans to reinstitute the Regional 
Commissioners, which would allow him to control the army 
and local administrative units from the center. These of-
fices were notorious during the Panchayat era for their lack 
of accountability and top-down control from the central-
ized government, making them into a repressive tool of the 
ministries. 
Girija is also trying to censor some ten newspapers, 
which he sees as supporting the Maoists. The Home Min-
istry went as far as reframing the role of the press as play-
ing a "crucial role for maintaining law and order in the 
society ... it should be playing a responsible role for the 
preservation of democracy and peace in the country .... If 
the media didn't follow a proper norm, it could have a haz-
ardous effect on the security situation."22 One could ask 
since when was it the norm of the press to align itself with 
the government? In democracy, isn't its role to play the 
watchdog? Thus, on several counts, the prime minister is 
using the Maoist movement as a means of taking away wide 
democratic rights. 
Objective conditions mitigate against concerted action 
against the Maoists. Even the mainstream papers and rul-
ers recognize the terrible inequality in the country, and that 
front', " Nepal News (27 September 2000) http:// 
www.nepalnews.com.np/contents/englishweekly/telegraph/2000/ 
sep/sep27/index.htm#6; Govt determined to counter terrorist at-
tacks : Joshi- Panel to probe Dolpa incident (28 Sep 2000) 
21 
"Cabinet holds discussion on role of RNA," The Kathmandu 
Post (28 Sep 2000); Insurgency needs to be solved without using 
army: Defence Ministry, Nepal News (30 Sep 2000) 
22 
"Call for a code of conduct for media," Nepal News (15 Sep-
tember 2000) http://www.nepalnews.com .np/contents/ 
engli shdail y /ktmpost/2000/sep/sep 16/i ndex. htm 
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the Maoists are riding on legitimate grievances, even if their 
approach is regarded as unconstitutional. As a result, there 
is widespread support for the Maoists in the countryside 
and great sympathy for them in the cities . There is satis-
faction in many circles that con·upt officials, who have gone 
so long unpunished, are now getting their comeuppance. 
There is a genera l consensus in the press that the problem 
is a political one and that the solution will also be political. 
Along with suppression, ministers make visits to the af-
fected areas with promises of big development programs 
that will lift the people out of poverty and win the people 
back from the Maoists. However, it is this very "develop-
ment" which has historically strengthened and expanded 
the ruling class and its bureaucratic allies and supported 
the spread of commercialization, all of which underlie the 
Maoist movement and give it soil in which to take root. I 
don't see how any government that goes by the old logic of 
development will have anything to offer. 
Afterward 
I have a problem with the title of this paper, Th e Maoist 
Movement and the Threat to Democracy. It implies the ex-
istence of democracy-as if democracy had been conjured 
up in Nepal merely by changing the country's constitution 
and allowing multiparty contest for the parliamentary in-
stitutions of the state without changing the bureaucratic 
machinery. Rather, in fact, the bureaucratic machinery of 
the state, of the parties, of international lenders and do-
nors, of multinational banks, and of commercial and in-
dustrial interests and institutions has been extended in even 
more new and imaginative forms . All this of course, as in 
the past, is in the name of the people, particularly the poor. 
This conjuration of democracy was made in the con-
text of unprecedented centralization of corporate power on 
a planetary level -called "globalization" in educated circles. 
(Of course, by its very nature capitalism has always been a 
planetary project.) Nepal's democracy movement and, 
more specifically, the drafting of the new constitution, did 
not occur in isolation, constructed solely out of the country's 
own hi story, but emerged as part of a general upsurge of 
democracy movements worldwide. These movements in 
the Philippines, South Africa, Peru , Chile, Myanmar, Ma-
laysia, China, Nigeria , the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and 
so on and on-all were let loose by a general undercutting 
EMANCIPATION OF KAMAIYAS/Fujikura 
of the international legitimacy that had been give.n to the 
post-colonial, but st ill very much colonized, regimes . The 
settlement and the construction of the new constitutional 
framework was paternalistically guided by international 
institutions, international money, and international advi-
sors (to be modeled on European parliamentary institutions 
as if Nepal had no hi story of its own) . The implementation 
of the new constitution was fo llowed by the same restruc-
turing, privatization, opening of commodity markets, ex-
propriation and dismantling of village communities, ap-
propriation of state and community properties, and imple-
mentat ion of international finance regimes. All of this was 
being prescribed across the world as the solution to the 
problems brought by the previous 50 years of foreign ad-
visers, foreign aid and grafting of foreign institutions. These 
issues render the actual existence of democracy in Nepal 
or the idea that it can be threatened, problematic, to say the 
least. 
It is difficult, reading urban newspapers on the one 
hand, and materials published by the Maoists and the In-
ternational Revolutionary Movement on the other, for me 
to ascertain the real effect of the Maoist movement, the 
extent of its support in the countryside, and whether it is 
really bringing about the goals that it espouses. What I can 
say is that the Maoist insurgency is finding a fertile base in 
the real grievances of people, especially young people, 
which even the mainstream papers and politicians admit, 
either in words or actions. Inequality in Nepal is said to be 
the worst in South Asia, while the paternalistic institutions 
that were once sustained by it but which also mediated and 
tempered the exploitation underlying this inequality are 
being di smantled in the name of modernization. Fifteen 
years ago in my dissertation research, I observed perva-
si ve debt as the foundation of the village communities and 
of the state. This debt, which provided a means of coercion 
of labor but was also tied up with moral obligations of lend-
ers to provide access to the means of production, is now 
being used to pry people apart from their means of liveli -
hood and communities . Traditional institutions, albeit im-
perfect, are giving away to brutal speculation in land and 
people. The tens of thousands of hill women shuffled into 
brothels in India and elsewhere in South Asia are emblem-
atic of this just as the toleration of it, and the social stigma 
given these women by the ruling classes of the country, are 
emblematic of their role more generally. 
21 
